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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

Case No. 920184-CA

v.

:

Priority No. 3

LESLIE C. ANDERSON,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a denial of a petition for postconviction relief.

This Court has jurisdiction to hear the

appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(g) (1992).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Did the trial court properly deny defendant's petition
for a writ of extraordinary post-conviction relief?

The issues

raised by defendant in his petition present only questions of
law, which this Court reviews for correctness with no deference
to the trial court's conclusion.
308-309 (Utah App. 1992).

Stewart v. State, 830 P.2d 306,

But see Bundv v. DeLand, 763 P.2d 803,

805 (Utah 1988) ("On appeal from denial of habeas corpus relief,
'we survey the record in the light most favorable to the findings
and judgment; and we will not reverse if there is a reasonable
basis therein to support the trial court's refusal to be
convinced that the writ should be granted.") (citations omitted).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions,
statutes and rules pertinent to the resolution of the issues
presented on appeal is contained in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with theft, a second degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-404 (1990) (R. 79).

On March 22, 1989, following a jury trial, defendant was

found guilty as charged, and on March 28, 1989, the trial court
sentenced defendant to an indeterminate term of 1 to 15 years in
the Utah State Prison and ordered defendant to pay a fine of
$2,000 (R. 106, 124-25, 132).
Defendant filed a notice of appeal in this Court on
April 11, 1989, arguing that he was denied due process and
effective assistance of counsel (R. 137). On December 19, 1989,
in an unpublished per

curiam opinion, this Court ejected

defendant's claims and affirmed his conviction (R. 152-153).
State v. Anderson, No. 890218-CA (Utah App. Dec. 19, 1989).

(A

copy of the Court's opinion is attached hereto as Addendum A.)
On or about February 25, 1992, nearly three years after
his conviction and over two years after this Court affirmed his
conviction on direct appeal, defendant filed what he called a
"Motion for Modification of Judgment" in the Second Judicial
District Court, in and for Davis County, State of Utah, advancing
the same arguments he now makes before this Court (R. 159-74).
The State filed a response to defendant's motion on February 26,
2

1992, arguing that defendant's motion was not properly before the
court.

The State noted that defendant's conviction already had

been affirmed by the Utah Court of Appeals and asserted that, in
any event, defendant's conviction was valid (R. 155-56).

On

February 27, 1992, Judge Douglas L. Cornaby denied defendant's
motion to modify judgment and ruled that it was without merit (R.
157).

(A copy of the court's ruling is attached hereto as

Addendum B.)

Defendant now appeals from that order.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

Given the nature of the claims advanced by defendant,
and the procedural posture of this case, a detailed account of
the facts is not necessary.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court properly denied defendant's petition
for post-conviction relief because the claims advanced by
defendant should have been raised on direct appeal.

Even if this

Court considers the merits of defendant's claims, it is clear
that the trial court properly denied defendant's petition.

A

review of the record demonstrates that the jury was properly
instructed on both the theft charge, for which defendant was
convicted, and the lesser included offense of possession of a
stolen vehicle.

This Court should therefore affirm the trial

court's denial of defendant's petition for post-conviction
relief.

3

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF BECAUSE
THE CLAIMS MADE BY DEFENDANT SHOULD HAVE BEEN
RAISED ON DIRECT APPEAL.
Although the trial court entitled its order "Ruling on
Motion to Modify Judgment," the court treated defendant's motion
as a petition for extraordinary post-conviction relief.l

See

State v. Workman, 806 P.2d 1198, 1202 (Utah App. 1991) (Utah
appellate courts "look to the substance of the ruling and not to
'the label attached . . . by the trial judge.'") (citation
omitted).

A review of the record, especially in light of the

procedural posture of this case, demonstrates that the trial
court properly denied defendant's petition.
Defendant advances essentially two arguments.

First,

defendant claims that the jury was not properly instructed on the
elements of the offense for which he was convicted.

Second,

defendant argues that Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990) and § 411-112 (Supp. 1991) prohibit the same conduct and that, pursuant
to State v. Shondel, 453 P.2d 146 (Utah 1969), he should have
been convicted of a third degree felony under § 41-1-1122
1

In 1991, rule 65B(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
(1992), replaced prior rule 65B(i). The new rule encompasses the
previous "petition for writ of habeas corpus" procedure and more
fully addresses post-conviction remedies under petitions for
extraordinary relief.
2

At the time of defendant's conviction, possession of a
stolen vehicle pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-112 was a third
(continued...)
4

instead of being convicted of a second degree felony under § 766-404•

Both issues should have been raised on direct appeal and

cannot be raised in a petition for post-conviction relief.3
It is well-established that the extraordinary writ
procedure provided for in rule 65B(b), Utah Rules of Civil
Proceduref "is not a substitute for and cannot be used to perform
the function of regular appellate review."
660 P.2d 1101, 1104 (Utah 1983).
P.2d 803, 804 (Utah 1988).

Codianna v. Morris,

Accord Bundv v. DeLand, 763

Rather, the function of post-

conviction relief is
to provide a means for collaterally attacking
convictions when they are so constitutionally
flawed that they result in fundamental
unfairness and to provide for collateral
attack of sentences not authorized by law.
Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 1034-35 (Utah 1989).
For these reasons:
It is therefore well settled in this state
that allegations of error that could have
been but were not raised on appeal from a
criminal conviction cannot be raised by
habeas corpus or postconviction review,
except in unusual circumstances.
Jensen v. DeLand, 795 P.2d 619, 620 (Utah 1989).

While Utah

2

(...continued)
degree felony. The legislature has since amended the provision
to designate the offense a second degree felony. See Utah Code
Ann. § 41-1-112 (Supp. 1991).
3

Although the trial court denied defendant's petition based
on other grounds, this Court may affirm the trial court's ruling
on any proper ground. State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d 257, 260 (Utah
1985) (M[T]his Court may affirm the trial court's decision on any
proper grounds, even though the trial court assigned another
reason for its ruling.").
5

courts have found such "unusual circumstances" to exist where a
defendant was unjustifiably denied an opportunity to raise an
issue on direct appeal, Hurst v. Cook, 777 P„2d at 1035
(collecting cases on "unusual circumstances"), the general rule
of waiver remains.

Dunn v. Cook, 791 P.2d 873, 879 (Utah 1990)

(Zimmerman, J., concurring in result).
In this case, the claims defendant now advances should
have been raised on direct appeal.

Defendant elected instead to

argue that his trial counsel was ineffective and that he was
denied due process.

This Court considered and rejected

defendant's appeal and should not now indulge defendant by
providing him yet a second opportunity to litigate issues that
should have been raised on direct appeal.

On that basis alone,

this Court should affirm the trial court's denial of defendant's
petition.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S
PETITION BECAUSE DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS THAT THE
JURY WAS NOT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED AND THAT HE
SHOULD HAVE BEEN SENTENCED FOR A LESSER
INCLUDED OFFENSE ARE WITHOUT MERIT.
Even if this Court were to consider the merits of
defendant's claims, it is clear from the record that th€* trial
court properly denied defendant's petition.

This Court in

Stewart v. State, 830 P.2d 306/ 309 (Utah App. 1992), stated:
[T]he standard of review to be applied in
reviewing a grant or denial of a petition for
writ of habeas corpus varies depending on the
issues raised on appeal. If the petition
presents questions of law, we afford no
deference to the trial court's conclusions.
6

If there are questions of fact, we defer to
the trial courts findings and will disturb
those findings only if they are clearly
erroneous.
Stewart, 830 P.2d at 309.

But see Bundv, 763 P.2d at 805 ("On

appeal from denial of habeas corpus relief, 'we survey the record
in the light most favorable to the findings and judgment; and we
will not reverse if there is a reasonable basis therein to
support the trial court's refusal to be convinced that the writ
should be granted.") (citations omitted).
The present appeal involves only questions of law,
which are reviewed for correctness.
Defendant's first claim, that the jury was not
instructed on the elements of theft under § 76-6-404, is without
merit.

As the district court noted in denying defendant's

petition,
Jury instruction number 11 specifically
required that the jury find the defendant
"Knowingly or intentionally" "obtained or
exercised unauthorized control over an
operable motor vehicle" and that the
defendant "had a purpose to deprive Stephen
Bown of said vehicle."
(R. 157). Jury instruction number 11 parallels the language of
SS 76-6-404 and 76-6-412(1)(a)(ii) and delineates every element
of the offense (R. 86). (A copy of jury instruction number 11 is
attached hereto as Addendum C.)

Defendant's reliance on State v.

Laine, 618 P.2d 33 (Utah 1980), is therefore misplaced.
Defendant's second claim, that he should have been
convicted of a third degree felony under § 41-1-112 instead of a
second degree felony under SS 76-6-404 and 76-6-412(1)(a)(ii)
7

also lacks merit.

The Utah Supreme Court made clear in State v.

Larocco, 794 P.2d 460f 462-63 (Utah 1990), that possession of a
stolen vehicle pursuant to § 41-1-112 was a lesser included
offense of theft of a motor vehicle under SS 76-6-404 and 76-6412(1)(a)(ii).A

In this case, the jury was properly instructed

not only on theft of a motor vehicle, but also on the lesser
included offense of possession of a stolen vehicle (R. 86, 87,
89).

Jury instruction number 14 specifically delineated the

elements of possession of a stolen vehicle pursuant to § 41-1112, and the jury determined that defendant was instead guilty of
theft.

(A copy of jury instruction number 14 is attached hereto

as Addendum D.)

Because theft of a motor vehicle and possession

of a stolen vehicle are separate offenses, and the jury was
instructed on both offenses and determined that defendant was
guilty of theft, defendant's Shondel argument was properly
rejected by the trial court.5

* Larocco. like this case, involved a conviction that was
entered before the legislature amended § 41-1-112 to designate
the offense of possession of a stolen vehicle a second degree
felony.
5

Defendant also appears to advance a sort of equal
protection argument by claiming that some of his fellow inmates
who were convicted of the same offense received sentences of only
zero to five years compared to his sentence of one to fifteen
years. (Br. of App. at 8-10). However, defendant has provided
no record material to support his allegations, and it is likely
that the individuals identified by defendant were convicted of
other lesser included offenses of theft. This Court should
therefore refuse to consider defendant's apparent equal
protection argument. See State v. Cook, 714 P.2d 296, 297 (Utah
1986) (references to matters outside of the record are
inappropriate and irrelevant and will not be considered).
8

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the
district court's denial of defendant's petition for postconviction relief.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this [fr

day of October, 1992.

ley General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the
foregoing Brief was mailed, postage pre-paid, to Leslie C.
Anderson, attorney pro se, Box 250, Draper, Utah, 84020, on this
day of October, 1992.
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State of Utah,

)
)
MEMORANDUM DECISION
* l a i n t U i « * Hespon&ent, > tt&ot iox ?sfo\ferttofb)
)

v.
Leslie C. Anderson,

>
)
)

Case No. 890218-CA

)

Defendant and Appellant.

)

Before Judges Orme, Davidson, and Garff.
PER CURIAM:
Defendant appeals his conviction of theft, a second
degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404
(1978). He appeals, claiming he was denied effective
assistance of counsel and his rights of due process. We
affirm.
At arraignment, defendant requested to act as his own
attorney but requested the court to appoint an attorney as
co-counsel. The court appointed an attorney and the case
proceeded to trial. On the day of trial, the court advised
defendant he would have to wear a leg brace under his pants as
a security measure against escape. Defendant refused.
Defendant then attempted to fire his attorney, and the court
denied his request. Subsequently, the court granted
defendant's request for a continuance. Defendant again refused
to wear a leg brace. The court barred him from the courtroom,
informed him he could return if he wore the leg brace and
permitted him to watch the trial on closed circuit television
in an adjoining room.
Defendant argues he was denied effective assistance of
counsel because he was removed from the courtroom and not
permitted to a c t a s co-counsel. Although defendants have a
right to act as their own counsel, their self-representation
may be terminated if they engage in serious and obstructionist
misconduct. Faretta v. California. 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46
(1975). In addition, trial courts are granted considerable
discretion it barring defendants from the courtroom for
disruptive behavior. Illinois v. Allen. 397 U.S. 337, 343

(1970). Further* to prove ineffective assistance of counsel,
defendant must demonstrate specific acts or omissions which
fall outside the wide range of professionally competent
assistance. State v. Gardner. 101 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 12 (1989).
The record clearly indicates that defendant used abusive
language towards the court and counsel and was uncooperative.
Under the circumstances, the court was well within its
discretion in banning him from the courtroom, and defendant
cannot complain about his self-caused inability to assist in
his defense. Further* defendant has made no claim that trial
counsel's representation was insufficient. We therefore find
that defendant was not denied ineffective assistance of
counsel.
Defendant also asserts that he was denied due process by
the court's decision to make him wear a leg brace. We hold
that the trial court acted within its discretion in ordering
defendant to wear the leg brace under his pants at trial. See
Illinois v. Allen. 397 U.S. 337 (1970); State v. Harding. 137
arit. 278* 670 P.2d 383 (1983)* £££&. d£ni£&* 465 U.S. 1013
(1984) (no abuse of discretion in shackling defendant at trial
where he had threatened counsel with bodily harm).
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•ADDENDUM B

f HED IN CLERK'S
OFFiCE
DAVIS ?pi!VT v •;-,.«>

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN A N D FOR THE
COUNTY OF DAVIS 1, STATE OF UTAH

rco ti

i JLU in JL

CLERL2.- :i;:?.-.C:-JK?

&

BY

DEPUTY CLERK
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

vs

i

LESLIE CLARK ANDERSON,

ON MOTION TO

)

RULING

)

MODIFY JUDGMENT
Case N o . 881706177

)

Defendant.

The defendant
defendant

is

has

appearing

Carvel R. Harvard.
The

filed

defendant

pro

a motion to modify

judgment.

se.

represented

The

State

is

The
by

Both parties have filed briefs.
claims

he

should

have

been

convicted

of

a

third degree felony, instead of a second degree felony.
The information charged the defendant with theft of a motor
vehicle

in

violation

of

U.C.A.

76-6*404.

tried by a jury and convicted.

The

defendant

Thereafter he appealed

to

was
the

Utah Court of Appeals and the trial court was affirmed.
The

motion

crime

to

theft

of an

degree.
jury

to

"obtained

is without

commit

U.C.A.

U.C.A.

instruction

find

the

number

defendant

exercised

76-6-404

makes

76-6-412(1)(a)(ii)

operable motor vehicle

Jury
or

theft.

merit.

11

as a felony

"Knowingly

unauthorized

or

control

a

designates

of the

specifically

it

second

required

the

intentionally"

over

an

operable

motor vehicle" and that the defendant "had a purpose to deprive
Stephen Bown of said vehicle."
The motion to modify judgment is denied.
Dated February 27, 1992.
BY THE COURT:

Certificate of Mailing:
This is to certify that the undersigned nailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Ruling to:
Carvel Harvard
Davis County Attorney Office
Farmington, Utah 84025
0

Dated the ^l*h

f

Leslie C. Anderson
c/o Utah State Prison
P. O. Box 250
Draper, Utah 84020
day of February 1992.
Deputy Cl^rk

ADDENDUM C

INSTRUCTION NO.

f±

Before you can convict the defendant of Theft, second
degree felony, as charged in the Information, you must find from
the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt/^aDt of the following
elements of the crime:
r

1. That the defendant, Leslie C. Anderson, obtained or /)C
exercised unauthorized control over an operable motor vehicle
belonging to Stephen Bovn, and
2.

That the defendant had a purpose to deprive Stephen,

Bovn of said vehicle, and
/(

3.

Defendant acted knowingly or intentionally, and

4.

That the defendant committed such acts on or about

September 28, 1988 through October 11, 1988, at Davis County,

/^

Utah.
If you find each of the above elements proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, it is your duty to find the defendant guilty of
theft as charged in the Information; however, if you are not
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of each and every one of the
foregoing elements, you should then consider the lesser included
offense of Unlawful Control Over a Vehicle•

ADDENDUM D

INSTRUCTION NO,

)¥

Before you can convict the defendant of Unlawful
Control Over a Vehicle, a lesser included offense, you must find
from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the following
elements of the crime:
1.

That the defendant, Leslie C. Anderson, exercised

unauthorized control over a vehicle belonging to Stephen Bown,
and
2.

That the defendant exercised such control over the

vehicle without the consent of either the owner or the lawful
custodian of the vehicle, and
3.

That the defendant did the foregoing knowingly or

intentionally and with an intent to temporarily d_eprive the owner
or lawful custodian of possession of the vehicle, and
4.

That the defendant did not return the vehicle to

the owner or lawful custodian within 24 hours after the exercise
of unauthorized control, and
5.

That the defendant committed such acts on or about

September 28, 1988 through October 11, 1988, at Davis County,
Utah.
If you find each of the above elements proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, it is your duty to find the defendant guilty;
however, if the State has failed to prove each and every one of
the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it is your duty to
find the defendant not guilty*

